Barbados has historically been an important domicile for Canadian-owned captives. The Barbados International Business Association reported that Canadian-owned captives accounted for 43% of its captive market in 2025, down from 51% in 2021. Historically, qualifying profits from non-Canadian insurance business could benefit from Canada’s foreign-affiliate rules and be distributed to a Canadian parent as “exempt surplus”. The Canada–Barbados double-taxation treaty, signed in 1980, formed part of the wider framework. However, this was never an automatic route to tax-free profits. A 2011 protocol, effective from December 2013, excluded entities benefiting from specified Barbados tax regimes, including certain insurance regimes, from many treaty benefits.

Those rules are central to the latest development. Under Canada’s foreign accrual property income (FAPI) regime, certain income earned by a controlled foreign affiliate is included in its Canadian parent’s taxable income, even if profits remain offshore. Existing provisions already treat income from insuring or reinsuring specified Canadian risks as FAPI. These generally concern risks linked to a Canadian resident, property in Canada or a business carried on in Canada.

In July 2026, Canada’s Department of Finance published draft legislation proposing to clarify how the rules apply when a foreign affiliate holds investments backing Canadian insurance liabilities, even though another company in the group actually underwrites the policies. The aim is to prevent investment income from falling outside the rules simply because the assets and insurance contracts sit in separate entities. The proposal is not a blanket ban on offshore captives, nor does it target assets backing genuine non-Canadian risks. While it remains draft legislation, the proposed effective date is for foreign-affiliate tax years beginning after 4 November 2025, if enacted.

For Canadian companies primarily seeking to insure domestic risks, moving a captive from Barbados to another foreign jurisdiction would not, by itself, remove Canadian tax exposure. An alternative could instead be to bring the insurance structure back onshore. Alberta has developed its own captive framework, and industry commentary published in October points to companies moving Canadian risks back there, citing regulatory flexibility and potential premiums  tax  of 3% on life ,general insurance whereas 4 % on property, casualty etc and an 8% general corporate tax.

For businesses with substantial international operations, however, the considerations may be different. Rather than simply bringing their insurance activities back to Canada, multinational groups may be looking for a regulated base from which to manage risks across several markets. This is where Malta could enter the picture. The Malta Financial Services Authority (MFSA) authorises and supervises insurance and reinsurance undertakings, including captives, under a framework aligned with EU insurance rules. An authorised Maltese insurer can, subject to regulatory requirements, use the EU’s passporting system to operate across the European Economic Area. Malta also offers protected cell company structures, which segregate the assets and liabilities of different insurance programmes within one corporate structure. Its legislation further provides for captives and, subject to conditions, the continuation in Malta of an insurer established elsewhere.

These features may interest Canadian-owned groups with subsidiaries, employees, property or supply chains across Europe. A Maltese captive could provide a regulated base for pooling and managing those non-Canadian exposures, rather than serving as a device to move Canadian insurance income offshore. Any structure would still need to meet Canadian tax rules, EU prudential requirements and the commercial substance expected of a genuine insurer.

The potential opportunity also coincides with a broader shift in EU–Canada relations. At their 30 October 2026 summit in Montréal, leaders launched the Canada–EU Alliance for the Future, identifying financial services and markets as a priority for closer cooperation and aiming to increase cross-border capital flows and access to financial services. They also agreed to define by the 2027 summit the concept of a closer association, short of EU membership.

 In the past PKF Malta was active in promoting captives in Toronto to set up locally and with the approval of MFSA we shall book another promotional visit for 2027.For the Island, this emerging relationship may present an opportunity. Canada’s tax proposals may prompt multinational groups to review how they organise insurance risks and supporting assets, while closer EU–Canada ties could reinforce their interest in European markets. In anticipation of FDI , may be in offering internationally active Canadian businesses a well-regulated European platform from which to insure and manage their European and other foreign exposures.

Dr Lina Klesper is an International Legal Assistant at PKF Malta

The post Join us to promote Toronto insurance business to migrate to local captives first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

The immediate trigger is the #casinosecrets investigation by a multi-country investigative consortium involving German security researcher Lilith Wittmann. According to Wittmann, internal documents from the Malta Gaming Authority (MGA) identify Frankfurt businessman Thomas Kalman as the ultimate beneficial owner of Red Rhino Limited, the Maltese company through which Platincasino operated under an MGA licence. The investigation traces the business from Malta to Curaçao, where the brand, domains and player database were sold to Latiform B.V. in 2023 for €6 million. Wittmann argues that important operational links continued after the formal sale.

The figures involved are substantial, but require careful qualification. The €250 million figure cited in the investigation is an estimate of allegedly unpaid German gambling tax for 2023–2025, calculated by the journalists rather than established by a court. It assumes that 85% of players were German and uses reported player losses to estimate the alleged shortfall. Separately, German prosecutors have put the alleged tax loss for 2024 alone at €77.6 million. In September, authorities searched 11 properties, arrested a main suspect and secured around €82 million in assets. Germany’s gambling regulator, the Gemeinsame Glücksspielbehörde der Länder (GGL), confirmed that the investigation concerns Platincasino.

The German regulatory history predates the latest raids. In 2023, the GGL identified Red Rhino as an illegal gambling provider and imposed a €50,000 coercive fine because an enforceable prohibition on its German offer had not been complied with. The regulator also targeted payment services connected to the operation. The significance for Malta is that a Maltese gambling licence did not give Red Rhino permission to operate in Germany. Since July 2021, providers have needed the relevant German authorisation to offer online gambling.

This is where the dispute with the MGA becomes important. Responding to questions from The Shift, the Maltese regulator rejected a blanket description of cross-border activity by MGA-licensed operators as “illegal gambling”. It stressed that applicants are assessed for suitability, funding, business operations, technical systems and anti-money-laundering controls, while licensees remain subject to risk-based supervision and enforcement powers. The MGA also pointed to EU treaty freedoms and Court of Justice principles. However, its response did not directly address the alleged €250 million tax shortfall, the documents reportedly extracted from its systems, or what regulatory action, if any, was taken concerning Red Rhino.

The dispute then escalated into an unusual legal battle in Germany. The MGA sought an injunction against Wittmann after she obtained documents from its online systems and publicly accused the regulator of creating “organized crime enablement schemes”. On 24 September, the Berlin Regional Court II partly upheld and partly overturned the requested measures. Wittmann remains prohibited from accessing the MGA system again, but the court allowed her to provide documents she had already obtained to journalists and investigators and allowed the disputed statements to remain. The ruling did not establish that her method of obtaining access was lawful. However, German reporting notes that the court considered her conduct capable of falling within the scope of Germany’s computer-hacking offence.

On a broader legal front, German courts have for years dealt with claims by players seeking repayment of losses from online casinos that lacked a German licence. In May, following the Court of Justice of the European Union ruling in C-440/23, FB v European Lotto and Betting Ltd and Deutsche Lotto- und Sportwetten Ltd of 16 April 2026, the German Federal Court of Justice (BGH) designated I ZR 216/25 as a lead-decision case concerning whether an online casino that lacked the required German licence must reimburse players’ losses. Following hearings in September, judgments in I ZR 216/25 and I ZR 78/25 are scheduled for 28 January 2027. The decisions could provide greater clarity on when German players can recover losses from operators that lacked the necessary German licence.

The issue could gain further prominence as the Platincasino investigation brings renewed attention to Germany’s enforcement of its gambling rules and the cross-border activities of Malta-linked operators. While Malta’s Bill 55, concerning the enforcement of foreign judgments against licensed gambling companies, remains a related point of contention, the German proceedings signal that the courts are becoming an increasingly important battleground in the dispute over the legal consequences of unlicensed online gambling.

Platincasino therefore sits at the intersection of several pressures on Malta: German enforcement against unlicensed gambling, questions about cross-border regulatory oversight, litigation over player losses and an EU-level dispute over the enforcement of judgments. None of this establishes the allegations against the individuals or companies involved. But as German investigations and court proceedings continue, Malta’s role in the international online-gambling chain is becoming harder to separate from the wider debate over how effectively a largely national regulatory system can supervise an industry that operates across borders.

Dr Lina Klesper is an International Legal Assistant at PKF Malta

The post Platincasino puts Malta’s gambling framework under renewed scrutiny first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

Three years after Giorgia Meloni’s government revived the long-dormant Messina Bridge project, however, the most striking feature of Italy’s €13.5 billion plan is not the engineering challenge. It is the extraordinary political, legal and institutional machinery that has grown around it.

The bridge was relaunched by Meloni’s government in 2023, with Transport Minister Matteo Salvini becoming its most prominent political champion. The proposed 3.7 kilometre suspension bridge is intended to connect Sicily with Calabria and become the world’s longest suspension bridge. Yet despite repeated declarations that construction was imminent, the project is still navigating approvals and scrutiny. The current timetable envisages the project entering its implementation phase by the end of 2026 and opening to traffic in 2034.

That is a considerable shift from the government’s earlier timetable. In 2025, the project had received a green light from the Interministerial Committee for Economic Planning and Sustainable Development, or CIPESS, but the Court of Auditors subsequently refused to register the resolution. The court raised questions over environmental compliance, changes to the existing contract and other procedural and financial issues. A November 2025 ruling also raised concerns over EU environmental and procurement requirements.

Nevertheless, Rome has refused to abandon the project. Instead, the government changed the legal framework and continued working to address the objections. The company responsible for the bridge says that the revised framework has dealt with the Court of Auditors’ concerns and that the project remains fully funded at an estimated €13.5 billion. It also says discussions with the European Commission have continued without an infringement procedure being opened.

The political determination to push ahead is perhaps understandable. Supporters portray the bridge as a long-term investment in southern Italy, improving transport connections between Sicily and the mainland and completing part of the European transport corridor running towards Palermo. For Salvini in particular, it has become a symbol of Italy’s ability to deliver major infrastructure rather than endlessly debate it. But that political symbolism may also explain why the project has become so difficult to separate from politics.

In June 2026, prosecutors in Rome opened a corruption investigation connected to the bridge’s approval process. Three people were investigated, including a former deputy president of the Court of Auditors, a lawyer who had previously served on the board of Stretto di Messina, and an entrepreneur. According to investigators, the suspects allegedly attempted to influence the Court of Auditors’ examination of the project. At this stage, these are allegations under investigation, not established findings of guilt.

Throughout much of the Messina Strait bridge saga, attention has also turned to a second problem that has shadowed the project for decades: organised crime.

The risk is not merely a cinematic fear of the Sicilian Mafia infiltrating a construction site. Large infrastructure projects generate thousands of contracts, subcontracting opportunities, land transactions, transport services and supply-chain relationships. That creates opportunities for organised crime to exploit legitimate economic activity, particularly in territories where the Sicilian Cosa Nostra and Calabrian ’ndrangheta have historically demonstrated extensive economic reach.

Italy’s National Anti-Corruption Authority, ANAC, explicitly warned Parliament in March that construction of the bridge would “attract” organised crime and called for strengthened controls and strict restrictions on subcontracting.

The concern is already becoming tangible as preparatory procedures advance. In September, the start of expropriation procedures prompted warnings that compensation for land could potentially reach properties controlled by organised crime groups. Stretto di Messina has responded that legality protocols are in place.

There is also a historical precedent. As criminologist Anna Sergi has documented for the Royal United Services Institute, previous attempts to develop the bridge attracted individuals with alleged links to organised crime, including a 2005 case involving attempted involvement in the project and bid-rigging. This shows that projects worth billions create opportunities for illegal actors not necessarily by controlling the entire construction contract, but by exploiting the layers surrounding it.

Moreover, this may be the central lesson of the Messina saga. The greatest threat to a mega-project is not always that it cannot be built. It is that the politics surrounding its construction become almost as complicated as the structure itself.

Italy now has to demonstrate that the bridge can survive scrutiny from courts, regulators, European institutions and anti-corruption authorities while preventing organised crime from turning public investment into private revenue. After decades of promises, that would be a more meaningful test of whether Italy can finally build its bridge than another declaration that construction is about to begin. For now, the Strait remains crossed by ferries. And the bridge remains a political project trying to become an infrastructure project.

The post Messina–Calabria: A bridge too far first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

The latest developments illustrate the problem. On Monday, a tanker was reportedly struck by three unknown projectiles while travelling eastbound through the Strait, while Iran’s Revolutionary Guard reported intercepting a US MQ-9 drone. Renewed US strikes on Iranian positions have pushed Brent crude back above $90 a barrel, after prices had fallen below $80 earlier in August. This market reaction is significant, but perhaps more important is what lies behind it: uncertainty.

According to UN Trade and Development (UNCTAD), before the military escalation began on February 28, Hormuz carried around 38% of global crude oil trade, 29% of LPG, 19% of LNG and 19% of refined oil products. The waterway is also important for chemicals including fertilisers, while its disruption has repercussions for wider maritime transport and supply chains.

By late August, however, traffic had reportedly fallen by approximately 95%. Between July 15 and August 23, an average of only around five vessels a day passed through the Strait. Much of the remaining traffic has involved tankers operating under naval escort or with tracking systems switched off.

The International Energy Agency’s (IEA) latest assessment, published on August 31, points to mounting pressure. Global oil supply is now forecast to decline by 4.3 million barrels per day in 2026, with increased production elsewhere only partly compensating for losses from the Middle East and Russia. At the same time, global oil demand is now expected to fall by 1.6 million barrels per day, a dramatic reversal from the 850,000-barrel-per-day increase forecast before the war.

Refined products are already feeling the strain. Tight supplies and declining inventories have pushed diesel, gasoline and jet-fuel refining margins to record levels. Although global inventories remain an important buffer, the IEA warns that they are being drawn down rapidly. The longer the disruption persists, therefore, the less comfortable that buffer becomes.

The economic consequences of the crisis cannot be measured simply by today’s oil price. They extend well beyond the energy sector. Higher fuel prices increase transportation and production costs, while higher freight rates, bunker fuel costs and war-risk insurance feed into the price of moving goods. Fertiliser is another critical concern. Higher costs or reduced availability can eventually translate into more expensive food, particularly in countries already vulnerable to food insecurity and high debt.

Moreover, the UN recently warned that disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and the Black Sea are effectively choking important arteries of global trade. The result of these crises is higher prices, weaker harvests and greater suffering for vulnerable populations.

Findings from the World Economic Forum highlight that industrial supply chains are also exposed to disruptions involving commodities such as methanol, aluminium, sulphur and graphite. These materials feed into manufacturing, chemicals and clean-energy industries, demonstrating that the Hormuz crisis is not merely an “oil shock” but (yet again) a broader test of the resilience of globalisation.

According to a European Commission Joint Research Centre scenario published in May, Europe appears particularly exposed, as it illustrates how severe a prolonged disruption could be. Assuming Hormuz traffic remains severely restricted through the end of 2026, oil prices could reach around $180 per barrel and gas prices €80 per megawatt-hour in the fourth quarter. Under that scenario, EU GDP growth would fall to 0.7% in both 2026 and 2027, compared with baseline forecasts of 1.1% and 1.4%. Inflation could rise to 3.5% in 2027, compared with 2.4% in the baseline.

These figures are scenario estimates, not forecasts of what will necessarily happen. Yet their importance lies precisely in demonstrating the economic price of prolonged uncertainty. This is where the growing call for a stronger UN role at the centre of mediation and for examining an international maritime mission to monitor shipping, facilitate civilian passage, establish de-escalation mechanisms and protect seafarers becomes economically significant.

Currently framed as part of a solution is the UN task force established in March to protect maritime transit for humanitarian purposes through the Strait of Hormuz, with an initial focus on commercial fertilisers and related raw materials. Such a mechanism would not, by itself, resolve the underlying US-Iran confrontation. Nor would it remove the need for diplomacy between the parties. But it could be a practical first step toward restoring predictability, which markets desperately need.

In a global economy built on interconnected supply chains, certainty has become an economic commodity in its own right. And the longer Hormuz remains uncertain, the more expensive that commodity becomes.

The post The uncertainty crisis of the Strait of Hormuz first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

At the heart of the conflict are sharply contrasting legal arguments.

Malta’s government and regulator argue that Bill 55 simply reaffirmed existing public-policy exceptions under EU law, without creating new grounds to reject judgments or imposing a blanket ban on enforcement. They say the law codifies Malta’s “long-standing public policy on online gaming” and reflects the limited ordre public exception already in the Brussels I Recast Regulation. In their view, unfair foreign judgments, which are often based on protectionist local monopoly laws, should not upset Malta’s regulated market.

By contrast, the European Commission and critics view Bill 55 as a protectionist loophole that breaks fundamental EU principles. By allowing Malta to flatly refuse to enforce rival EU court orders, Brussels says it violates the requirement that Member States mutually recognize judicial decisions. In this view, Bill 55 provides Malta with an open-ended shield, as it obliges Maltese judges to dismiss any claim against an operator licensed in Malta. Such wholesale non-enforcement goes beyond the narrow “public policy” ground usually allowed; the Commission argues and thus undermines mutual trust in the EU legal order.

The Austrian side, and by extension, Germany, adds further tension. Austria maintains a strict state gambling monopoly, with its courts treating any unlicensed play as illegal. From Austria’s perspective, Maltese licensees were acting unlawfully under Austrian law. As Malta’s courts have refused to honour Austrian rulings, Austria’s judicial response has been to find ways around Malta’s law, for example, by ordering Austrian banks to pay out or by invoking rarely used legal provisions to keep judgments alive.

Over the past year, three significant proceedings before the CJEU have further shaped the legal landscape.

In Wunner (Case C‑77/24, Jan 2026) the CJEU held that in damages claims for illegal gambling, the “place of damage” is the gambler’s habitual residence. Concretely, an Austrian who lost money betting on a Malta-licensed site had his losses deemed to occur in Austria, meaning Austrian law applied. The Malta Gaming Authority noted this ruling was “definitely impactful” but “neither groundbreaking nor unexpected,” confirming that local laws often govern such claims, though Malta’s legal defences remain intact.

In April 2026 the CJEU’s Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou issued an opinion in Spielerschutz Sigma (C‑683/24). He found the Austrian court’s preliminary reference technically inadmissible but nonetheless opined that Article 56A would be “manifestly incompatible” with EU rules on recognition and enforcement. Emiliou warned that Bill 55 appears designed primarily to protect Malta’s gaming industry, an “essential” sector, and that economic interests alone cannot justify overriding EU freedoms. He stressed that foreign judgments against Maltese operators must, in principle, be recognised and enforced in all Member States. While AG opinions are non-binding, this was a clear signal that Malta’s statute is on shaky ground under Brussels I bis.

Then, on 21 May 2026, the CJEU delivered its judgment in Mr Green (C‑198/24). In that cross-border debt case, an Austrian player had obtained a judgment ordering Malta-licensed Mr Green Limited to repay €62,878 and sought a European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) to freeze the operator’s assets abroad. The question was whether laws like Malta’s Bill 55 count as a risk factor for asset dissipation. The Court answered in the affirmative, holding that a court issuing an EAPO may take into account the existence, in the Member State where the debtor is established, of a law capable of impeding enforcement of the claim. In other words, Article 56A itself may justify urgent asset-freezing, by evidencing that the debtor might evade payment. As one commentator noted, the very existence of Malta’s law can now weigh in favour of granting cross-border freezing relief.

Taken together, these rulings and opinions have sharpened the legal stakes. The AG’s advice and the Mr Green judgment both suggest that Malta’s carve-out for gaming licenses could backfire, by encouraging creditors to bypass local courts entirely. Maltese operators now face possible EAPOs on foreign accounts and a legal precedent (Wunner) that many refund claims can proceed under other Member States’ laws. These developments place additional pressure on Malta’s “point of supply” licensing model, which assumes a Maltese licence allows cross-border operations.

The post Gaming industry under growing EU pressure first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

This rebound has occurred despite higher flight costs and longer journey times. With direct connections between Russia and the EU still suspended, travellers have adapted by routing through third countries such as Turkey, Serbia or the United Arab Emirates to reach Schengen destinations. Although these indirect routes are typically more expensive, low-cost airlines have adjusted to the rerouting and continue to offer relatively competitive fares, for example, on connections from Moscow to Paris via transit hubs like Istanbul.  At the same time, visa procedures have become costlier. Higher Schengen application fees meant Russian residents spent €48,527,520 on applications in 2024, of which €3,590,800 was effectively lost on rejected cases. Yet demand has remained resilient. Tourism representatives attribute this to improved economic conditions and rising disposable incomes, while industry insiders note that visa issuance stabilised in 2024, with many EU and associated countries still granting visas to Russian travellers.

Demand remains driven by sustained interest in classic European destinations, as reflected in booking data.  In early 2025, hotel reservations from Russia for the spring–summer season rose by around 33% year-on-year in Italy, 65% in Spain and 45% in France.  In 2024, Italy recorded the highest number of visa applications from Russian residents, followed by France, Spain, Greece and Hungary.  By contrast, EU states bordering Russia, including Finland and Poland, issued only limited numbers of visas, reflecting stricter security considerations.

The EU has steadily tightened visa rules for Russians as part of its security response.  In September 2022, the EU fully suspended its 2011 visa facilitation agreement with Russia.  This raised visa fees from €35 to €80 and introduced additional paperwork and longer processing times.  In the same period, the European Commission issued guidelines asking member-state consulates to “deprioritise non-essential travel” by Russians, meaning tourist and leisure visas are given very low priority. Consulates were told they could take up to 45 days, instead of 15, to decide on Russian visa applications and request additional documents for scrutiny.

On 7 November 2025, the Commission went further by issuing implementing rules to ban routine multiple-entry Schengen visas for Russian citizens.  Under the new rules, almost all Russian applicants must get only single-entry visas, forcing them to apply for each visit afresh.  Only a few “low risk” categories, such as close family of EU residents and professional transport workers, are exempt under certain conditions.  Notably, the Commission decision is officially advisory, and in practice, many EU embassies had already been issuing few multi-entry visas for Russians.  Industry experts argue the measure will have minimal impact on tourist flows, since consulates were already granting only one-time visas in most cases.

Most recently, in January 2026, the European Commission adopted a first-ever EU Visa Strategy, explicitly linking visa policy to security and foreign policy objectives.  The strategy proposes concrete measures to leverage visa policy to promote the EU’s strategic interests and bolster its security framework. This includes potential targeted restrictive visa measures to suspend, refuse, or restrict visa applications in response to hostile actions by third countries, such as Russia, that undermine EU security, as part of a future legislative proposal to revise the Visa Code.  In an increasingly volatile geopolitical environment, this would allow the EU to better respond to cases of hybrid attacks, information manipulation and interference, the politically motivated instrumentalisation of migrants, the weaponisation of migration, and open acts of aggression.  It would enhance the Union’s strategic autonomy and coherence, aligning visa policy more closely with the objectives of the EU’s common foreign and security policy.  In short, the strategy gives Brussels greater flexibility to tighten visa access for Russians at short notice, potentially making tourist flows more conditional and less predictable.

In conclusion, Russians have resumed seeking EU holidays when they can afford them, while the EU is tightening its visa system in response to security concerns. However, so far, the effect on tourist numbers seems limited.  The restriction on multi-entry visas is unlikely to affect tourist flows, as visa-issuing officials have issued virtually none for the past two years.  Observers note that most Russian tourists flying into Europe in 2024 did so with freshly issued short-term visas.   In short, demand rather than policy remains the main driver of travel.  Russian tourism to Europe is likely to persist, but under a tighter and more conditional visa regime increasingly shaped by geopolitics.

The post Russian tourism to Europe and the new EU Visa strategy first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

The ruling significantly raises the stakes for Malta’s gambling sector. It opens the door for hundreds of similar claims in Austria and Germany and reinforces the principle that local gambling laws, rather than Maltese law, will often govern disputes over player losses.  While the judgment does not directly address Malta’s legislative response to such claims, it adds pressure to an already contested legal framework.

The Malta Gaming Authority (MGA) is currently reviewing the implications of the case.  It described the decision as “definitely impactful” but “neither groundbreaking nor unexpected”, as Austrian courts have applied similar reasoning for years.  According to the MGA, while the judgment confirms that cross-border, non-contractual damages actions against directors are admissible under the Rome II Regulation, it does not eliminate legal defences.

One such defence is Malta’s Bill 55, formally Article 56A of the Gaming Act, enacted in June 2023. The provision instructs Maltese courts not to recognise or enforce foreign judgments that would undermine a Maltese gambling licence. The law was justified as a measure to protect Malta’s vital gaming industry from “potentially costly legal claims abroad”.  In practice, it has been invoked to argue that enforcing Austrian and German refund judgments would conflict with Malta’s public policy and its interpretation of EU internal market freedoms.  The MGA maintains that Article 56A merely reaffirms existing EU law principles, particularly the ordre public exception in the Brussels I Recast Regulation, and does not impose a blanket ban on enforcement.

Maltese courts have already relied on this reasoning to refuse enforcement of Austrian rulings. On the same day the CJEU delivered its Wunner judgment, Malta’s civil court rejected an Austrian order requiring Betway to repay more than €83,000 to an Austrian player.  The court found that recognising the judgment would violate Malta’s public policy by effectively penalising conduct that is lawful under Maltese law and permitted under EU internal market rules.  This, it said, met the high threshold required to invoke the public policy exception under the Brussels I Recast Regulation.

Notably, the court did not rely solely on Article 56A to justify its refusal.  Instead, it examined the broader legal context, reinforcing the reasoning behind the decision.  This suggests a deliberate effort to strengthen the legal foundations of Bill 55 in anticipation of further challenges.

These developments come as especially Austrian and German courts continue to see a surge in claims from players seeking to recover losses in Malta.  Against this backdrop, Malta’s legislative response has drawn the attention of the European Commission. On 18 June 2025, the Commission launched an infringement procedure (INFR(2025)2100) against Malta for failing to comply with Regulation (EU) 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. Brussels argues that Bill 55 obliges Maltese courts to systematically refuse recognition of other EU judgments against local licence-holders, thereby shielding the online gaming sector from cross-border litigation.

The Commission warned that Malta is applying the public policy exception far beyond the “exceptional cases” envisaged under EU law, undermining mutual trust in the EU judicial system. The infringement procedure is now pending and could ultimately lead to a case before the CJEU.

Further pressure may come from a related development at EU level. In October 2025, Advocate General Emiliou delivered his opinion in Case C-198/24 (TQ v Mr Green Limited), focusing on the European Account Preservation Order (EAPO) Regulation.  While the case did not directly address the legality of Bill 55, the Advocate General suggested that EU consumers could use the EAPO mechanism to secure asset-freezing orders against Maltese firms that refuse to pay gambling-related debts.

Importantly, he indicated that national barriers to enforcement, such as Malta’s refusal to recognise foreign judgments under Article 56A, may be relevant when assessing the risk that a debtor could evade payment.  This could justify the freezing of assets held by Maltese gambling companies elsewhere in the EU, effectively allowing claimants to bypass Bill 55 by targeting non-Malta-based accounts.

Taken together, these developments suggest that the legal walls around Bill 55 may be closing in. While neither the Wunner ruling nor the Advocate General’s opinion constitutes a direct EU challenge to Malta’s law, both highlight the growing tension between Malta’s regulatory model and the EU’s cross-border justice framework. The European Commission’s infringement procedure will be decisive in determining whether Article 56A can withstand scrutiny or must be amended or repealed.

The post Walls closing in on Bill 55 first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

Affordability in Malta is also argued to be reflected in very high home‐ownership rates. For example, among Maltese households in which all members are under 35, approximately 91% owned or co-owned their home in 2023, up from approximately 81% in 2014. The Central Bank’s Household Finance survey confirms that, even in the lower-income quintiles, home ownership remains above 60%. This may reflect cultural norms, such as a strong preference for ownership, as well as policy support, such as favourable lending, grants, and tax rules. Malta has implemented several schemes to support first-time buyers, such as the notional equity method, and has allocated free government land to contractors such as Malita to build affordable units. In 2024, Malita secured a €22 million agreement with the European Investment Bank to expand social housing.

By contrast, larger markets in the EU, such as France and Germany, show different housing and affordability patterns. Malta’s homeownership rate vastly exceeds both France’s of approximately 61% and Germany’s of approximately 47%. Notably, Germany is unique in Europe for its majority-rental model, with 53% of Germans renting. Across the EU, residential property has become much less affordable since 2010. From 2010 to 2025, average sales prices in the EU jumped approximately 55%, and rents approximately 27%, far outpacing the 20% growth in incomes. While in Malta, housing remains more affordable than the EU average, markets such as Sweden, the Netherlands, and Ireland have price-to-income ratios well above 120. Thus, governments are responding on multiple fronts to try to sweeten the pill of buying or renting.

France faces tight markets, especially in big cities. The share of social and public housing in France is among the highest in Europe, accounting for approximately 17% of all dwellings, owing to an extensive public housing sector and longstanding subsidies. France has implemented income-based aids and interest-free loans for first-time buyers in high-demand areas, alongside tax breaks for rental investment and purchases. Rents in tight zones are partially regulated through a rent-cap mechanism. Yet despite extensive social housing and subsidies, including rental and homebuyer assistance, urban rents continue to rise faster than incomes in many areas. In 2024, France’s price-to-income ratio of 107 indicates modest pressure. Critics note that steadily rising construction costs, long planning delays, and recent cuts in some subsidies continue to strain affordability in France.

Germany’s recent price boom has begun to strain households despite stringent rent laws, pushing more young people towards renting or co-living. As a predominantly renter nation, Germany has strong tenant protections and rent controls in place, which have historically kept living costs in check. Nationwide, the federal government has promised new tax incentives to spur construction of rental housing from 2024. However, challenges remain, as cities like Berlin, experimented with strict rent caps, though courts nullified the local law, highlighting legal limits of top-down controls. Germany generally follows a policy that combines social housing investment with welfare support for low-income tenants, rather than the homeowner-focused tools seen in Malta. A previous “Baukindergeld” subsidy for families with children to boost homebuying was allowed to lapse in 2021, and no direct equivalent has been reintroduced.

Overall, affordability pressures are broad in Europe. The contrast with France and Germany illustrates how different institutional legacies, including rental norms and welfare systems, shape both housing outcomes and the tools chosen to address them. Despite divergent approaches, the persistent challenge of demand driven by population growth, urbanisation, or tourism continues to outpace new construction. The current situation suggests that states must further subsidise new builds, as without such support, first-time buyers face difficulties maintaining social lives due to high rents, loan repayments, and rising living costs. As Europe debates an “Affordable Housing Plan” for 2026, it remains clear that no single solution fits all contexts. In Malta’s case, strong incomes and deeply entrenched homeownership have so far softened the impact of rising prices. However, policy must remain vigilant as lower incomes or higher interest rates would quickly render the market unaffordable.

Dr Lina Klesper is an international legal assistant at PKF Malta

The post An island of stability in Europe’s affordable housing crisis first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

Tourism has been a star performer, fuelling jobs and investment across the economy. In 2024, Portugal hosted 31.6 million visitors, of whom about 19.4 million were international visitors. International visitor-spending jumped to €31.8 billion, marking an all-time high and exceeding pre-pandemic levels. In 2025, the sector is forecast to account for 21.5% of GDP and support 1.2 million jobs, representing nearly 25% of total employment. There is also strong optimism for 2026, with forecasts pointing to a 12% increase in visitors and tourism revenues.

Portugal’s tech and startup scene is thriving as a new growth engine for the country. More than 5,000 startups now operate nationwide, marking an 8% increase in 2025. They raised roughly €886 million in venture funding in 2024, about 55% more than in 2023. These were often large financing rounds, for example, a domestic EV-charging firm raised approximately €100 million. More than half of these startups generate significant revenue abroad, giving the sector an export orientation. Collectively, they contribute around 1% of GDP and employ about 28,000 people with salaries typically well above the national average. For Portugal, this underscores a shift toward a high-value economy. The government’s support for startup visas, tax incentives, and near-universal high-speed internet has helped power this innovation boom.

Moreover, international companies are taking notice. In global surveys, Portugal ranks among Europe’s most attractive countries for new investment projects. In 2024, Portugal attracted roughly €13.2 billion in foreign direct investment, marking about 19% more than in 2023. High-profile projects include US semiconductor packager Amkor expanding its Portuguese plant, auto-supplier Bosch boosting its output, and a Renault-Geely partnership building a new engine factory to produce electric motors for hybrid vehicles. These deals are expected to create over 1,000 skilled jobs. Portugal has also gained international confidence, with its credit rating upgraded to “A” by Fitch and Moody’s, marking the first time in over a decade that the two main agencies have placed Portugal on the “A” scale.

Green energy and infrastructure build-out are high on Portugal’s agenda to reinforce growth in the short- and long-term. In 2024, staggering 71% of its electricity came from renewables such as wind, solar and hydro. The government has set one of Europe’s most ambitious renewable energy targets, aiming for 93% by 2030. Major projects are underway, such as Portugal’s largest onshore wind farm, the 274 MW Tâmega wind complex being constructed by Iberdrola, and a 100 MW green-hydrogen electrolyser, with installations completed at Sines refinery in January. On the transport side, a €2.4 billion tender was relaunched in early 2026 for a key section of the Porto-Lisbon high-speed rail line, which will cut travel times and ease congestion. Upgrades to ports, especially Sines, and highways are also in progress, improving logistics nationwide.

Portugal’s manufacturing and agri-exporters are also gaining momentum. Exports of goods grew in 2023-2024, driven by industry diversification and are expected to increase by 5.1% in nominal terms in 2026, after sluggish growth in 2025. Leading sectors such as cars, auto parts, and machinery have increased shipments to near-shoring EU markets, and traditional exports are at new highs. For example, Portugal’s footwear industry, a major export, saw shipments rise in early 2025 despite global competition. Wine, olive oil and tech exports remain strong in established markets, including Germany, France, and the US, and are gaining ground in emerging ones. This export momentum, together with booming tourism, provides Portugal with a strong foundation for growth.

Behind these trends lie prudent policies. Portugal has run small fiscal surpluses since 2023 and cut its debt ratio from over 130% of GDP during the pandemic to around 90% today. Prudent budgets and low inflation have kept borrowing costs down. Recent measures aim to sustain momentum, such as the 2025 budget, which introduced a decade-long tax break for young professionals, including a 100% income tax exemption in their first year, to curb emigration. Other reforms, such as R&D tax credits, startup visas, and streamlined regulations, further aim to improve Portugal’s business environment.

Portugal’s growth is expected to be about 2.3% in 2026, well above the eurozone average, amid low inflation and rising household incomes. One analysis even ranked Portugal as the world’s top-performing advanced economy in 2025. However, clear challenges remain, including ensuring a sufficient housing supply to meet tourist and expat demand and efficiently deploying EU recovery funds. But the overall trajectory is clear – with diversified growth and consistent policy, Portugal has emerged as a southern European success story.

Dr Lina Klesper is an international legal assistant at PKF Malta

The post Portugal’s economic resurrection first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.

It appears that the economy has been severely affected by intense competition from China, as industries that were traditionally ‘Made in Germany’, such as cars, robots, and high-quality household appliances, are increasingly being taken over by Chinese firms. Due to $230 billion in Chinese government subsidies for its car industry, China has claimed the tightly held title of the largest car exporter, with Germany only in fourth place, behind Japan and Mexico.

Since last year, German companies have also been burdened by US tariffs. Declining exports, especially to the USA, and a sluggish economy are prompting worries about structural decline, especially as industrial production has declined for the fourth year in a row, leaving many small and medium-sized enterprises disappointed and frustrated.

Germany is also losing momentum in climate protection, as greenhouse gas emissions fell less sharply in 2025 than in previous years despite the expansion of solar energy. CO2 emissions particularly increased in transport and buildings. A warning sign is that Germany’s economic downturn in energy-intensive industries led to lower CO2 emissions. This raises concerns as these are not sustainable, structural reductions in emissions. For the German economy, there is an urgent need for investment in modernisation and climate-neutral production.

The German economy is not picking up momentum, and the profound changes in industry continue to affect the labour market. The number of unemployed has been rising steadily for over three years, reaching 6.2 per cent in December. The latest figures show no sign of improvement at the beginning of the year. Last year, job cuts mainly affected those employed in traditional industrial sectors, particularly the automotive industry, with major car brands and their suppliers’ cutting jobs, resulting in around 140,000 job losses in the industry. Hopes are now high that investment programmes in infrastructure and defence will create jobs in industry and construction in 2026.

In 2025, the number of insolvent companies in Germany reached its highest level in more than ten years. Over the course of the year, 23,900 companies filed for insolvency, with micro-enterprises accounting for the largest share of corporate insolvencies. Heavy indebtedness, difficulties in obtaining new loans and structural burdens such as energy prices and regulation are especially putting small and medium-sized enterprises under enormous pressure. Concerns remain that the ongoing economic downturn, high costs, and bureaucracy will continue to drive insolvencies.

Despite these challenges, start-ups seem to boom in the shadow of the crisis. Last year, more start-ups were founded in Germany than ever before, marking a record 3,568 new start-ups in 2025. The number of start-ups was 29 per cent higher than in the previous year, and the trend is expected to continue in the current year. With more than a quarter of the start-ups founded using AI as an important part of their business model, AI is considered the key driver of this unprecedented start-up boom. For Germany, this offers a glimmer of hope for its reputation as an attractive business location for entrepreneurs and companies of the future.

Overall, it seems that the German business model, which is based on a strong industry and its exports, is currently facing increasing pressure, particularly due to US tariffs and Chinese competition. Chancellor Merz is preparing the coalition for a difficult year in 2026. He warns that the economic situation must be given top priority, acknowledging that it is very critical in some sectors. Solving the problem of high labour and energy costs, as well as bureaucratic and tax burdens, is on the agenda, with the aim of strengthening trust in politics and social cohesion.

However, the ruling parties remain divided on fiscal policy. While the CDU/CSU could envisage faster tax cuts for companies than stated in the coalition agreement, the SPD is sceptical. Social Democrats argue that flat-rate tax reductions do little to stimulate the economy and instead resemble a scattergun approach to subsidies, favouring targeted measures, such as higher inheritance taxes.

Time will tell whether Chancellor Merz’s political and economic agenda will deliver a turnaround this year. With five state elections scheduled for 2026, Germany’s political balance could shift significantly, as polls show the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) gaining ground while governing parties lose support. What is already clear, however, is that renewed growth is likely to come at a cost: higher public debt through government investment, alongside an economically liberal reform course that prioritises competitiveness while placing pressure on the welfare state.

The post Watch Germany’s fragile economy first appeared on The Malta Business Weekly.