Reassessing the rules-based global order

On 3 January 2026, a major event occurred in Venezuela that evoked historical similarities. The United States’ operation to detain Nicolás Maduro closely resembled the events of 3 January 1990, when the United States, under President George H. W. Bush, captured Manuel Noriega following a military intervention in Panama. While the justifications differed slightly, both actions reflected the recurring American narrative concerning narcotics and drug trafficking. The coincidence of the date received little attention in local media. In both instances, Washington acted decisively to remove leaders it deemed illegitimate and destabilising. However, the legal and international ramifications of the Venezuelan operation are considerably more complex and prompt critical questions regarding the current state of the global order.

Indeed, under international law, forcibly removing a head of state without a United Nations Security Council resolution is highly controversial, particularly when military force is involved. Such use of force is permitted only in cases of self-defence or with Security Council authorisation, neither of which applied in Venezuela. However, any attempt to secure a Council mandate would have been futile, as Russia and China, both permanent members with veto power, have considerable economic and security interests in Venezuela. Or better put, they possessed. Their participation in the parallel oil fleet assisting Caracas in evading sanctions rendered any intervention resolution ineffective. Consequently, the United States acted unilaterally, aware that multilateral approval was unattainable. Venezuela’s strategic significance to these powers is deliberate.

Additionally, over the past decade, Iran has become increasingly important to the country. As I stressed, to China even more. Tehran has utilised Caracas as a logistical bridge into Latin America to challenge American influence. Meanwhile, China has invested billions in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications, securing long-term access to resources and political leverage. Russia’s involvement peaked in 2018 with the deployment of strategic bombers to Venezuela, signalling its willingness to contest American dominance in the region and support Maduro following the election. Although Moscow’s engagement has evolved, its support for Maduro has remained consistent, motivated by both geopolitical rivalry and economic interests.

Within this context, the American intervention denotes a renewed adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, the United States’ longstanding policy opposing foreign interference in the Western Hemisphere. This 19th-century doctrine, which designates the Western Hemisphere as an American sphere of influence, regained prominence during the Trump administration. The underlying message is explicit and clear. The Americas fall under Washington’s strategic protection, and adversarial foreign powers are prohibited from establishing a strategic presence. Thus, the operation in Venezuela extended beyond the removal of Maduro, serving as a clear signal to Beijing, Moscow, and Tehran that the Western Hemisphere constitutes a non-negotiable boundary.

This strategic assertion goes beyond Latin America to include Greenland, which has emerged as a new strategic frontier. The United States increasingly contends that Greenland falls within the Western Hemisphere’s security perimeter, regardless of its status as part of the Kingdom of Denmark. This position is supported by historical precedent. During the Second World War, following Denmark’s occupation by Nazi Germany in 1940, the United States and Canada expressed major concern over the potential for German military presence in Greenland. Due to its proximity to North America, Greenland represented a potential base for military or surveillance operations. In response, Washington negotiated with Danish authorities, possibly in exile, and acted quickly to secure control of the island. By the war’s end, the United States had established 17 military installations in Greenland, including airports and meteorological stations, which later became integral to the North Atlantic defensive architecture and Cold War strategic infrastructure.

Currently, the strategic importance of the Arctic has increased substantially. The melting of ice due to climate change has opened new commercial routes, heightened rivalry for resources, and prompted Russia to expand its military presence in the region. Obviously, the Trump administration will not attest to climate change. However, China, which has declared itself a “near-Arctic state,” has invested in scientific stations and economic partnerships. Within this context, the Trump administration’s proposal to purchase Greenland, originally seen as symbolic, now appears to show a more extensive strategic calculation. A similar proposal was made during the Truman administration in 1946, but interest waned after NATO’s establishment and Denmark’s subsequent membership. Control of Greenland provides the United States with exceptional surveillance capabilities, enhanced missile defence positioning, and access to rare minerals vital for advanced technology, particularly to reduce competition with China. In this scenario, Europe remains largely an observer.

Examining the cases of Venezuela and Greenland together reveals a broader trend, that the post-Second World War rules-based international order is deteriorating. Principles that once guided global affairs, such as multilateralism, legal constraints, and diplomatic consensus, are increasingly supplanted by unilateral actions, power rivalries, and the emergence of regional spheres of influence. The Security Council, formerly the arbiter of international legitimacy, is now immobilised by vetoes and competing geopolitical interests. This deterioration is not attributable to a single actor. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea, Iran’s regional interventions, and the proliferation of parallel economies have contributed to a global environment where power supersedes principle. The Venezuelan case is particularly illustrative, demonstrating that even established democracies may act outside the legal framework when strategic and security interests are perceived to be at risk, regardless of broader acceptance or approval. We have to wait and see where this chaos will lead.