Last weekend I was following what’s happening around Europe and came across the latest impasse over the EU’s 18th package of sanctions on Russia. Yes, you are reading that correctly – it is the 18th package. Not sure what Ursula and Björn are thinking. What’s certain, though, is the fragility in reaching unanimity when it comes to Common and Foreign Security Policy. Indeed, member states look at their national interests when they are at stake.
In summary, last Sunday, EU Permanent Representatives or better put, ambassadors, met for an extraordinary session of COREPER II (the Committee of Ambassadors) to push through a sanctions’ proposal that includes an adjusted oil price cap targeting Russian revenues from maritime trade. What was meant to be a swift meeting, as we are now accustomed to under the current EU Commission, descended into hours of tense negotiations. Well, I know what this means, as I spent hours in the Justus Lipsius and Europa Council buildings. Apparently, Malta stood firm in opposing the proposed price-cap mechanism. However, this was not done out of defiance, as we have always cooperated on this matter, not least by providing additional funding for Ukraine’s resistance to Russia, and also in view of the fact that during the FAC on Monday, Malta did not veto the sanctions’ package, albeit expressing reservations. We were not alone in this, as there were other member states in the exact same position, who also expressed reservations. Only Slovakia vetoed the 18th package of sanctions.
Sadly, our objections were being portrayed in certain circles, as uncooperative. Alas, that’s the reporting of mainstream media. Certainly, that framing is not only misleading but truly unjust. Malta’s position mirrored what every other member state has done time and again when its domestic industries, competitiveness, or economic model were put at risk. Germany is no different, and the chef de cabinet of the sitting president knows this quite well. Greece and Cyprus also voiced concern. The proposed mechanism, pegging Russian oil at 15% below prevailing market prices, may seem technical in nature, but in practice, it strikes at the heart of Europe’s maritime industry. Sincerely, I would have done it differently. However, the current EU Commission is all about theory and no practical matters. We saw this with the CSRD. That’s the problem when you do not have proper economists at the top.
During my years in Brussels, serving within the Political and Security Committee, I dealt with countless dossiers that jeopardised member states’ interests. However, a compromise was always found. With the current EU Commission, you just can’t negotiate. In his classical book, Friedrich von Hayek depicted what the Road to Serfdom would look like when authorities or institutions interfere with the market. And we’re already past that point. Each package of sanctions carries legal, political, and economic weight, especially when energy, shipping or financial flows are involved. Malta has consistently argued for better coordination, particularly with the G7, to avoid asymmetries in enforcement and to prevent competitive disadvantages for EU industries. In this case, the proposed sanctions’ package risks undercutting our own maritime cluster without achieving a commensurate geopolitical impact.
The challenge, unfortunately, lies not only in the content of the measures but also in the mindset driving them. The European Commission’s sanctions strategy continues to be disproportionately shaped by the political and ideological motivations of a few powerful actors at the top. Björn Seibert has become a key architect of the EU’s opposition to Russia and of the shaping of the EU’s financial and economic trade architecture. There must be a reason for this self-interest. As William of Ockham puts it: “ceteris paribus, the explanation with the fewest assumptions should be favoured.” According to a recent Politico profile, Seibert operates from a position of unchecked influence, tightly controlling key policy files and wielding disproportionate sway over decision-making processes. This centralisation of power has reduced room for deliberation, sidelined member states’ powers, and fostered an institutionally obtuse vision built on Germanising Europe. If one remains fixated on punishing Russia rather than advancing a credible European security strategy and integrating Ukraine into the EU as quickly as possible, then the conclusion is that both Seibert and von der Leyen either have an axe to grind or are pursuing other interests while using Ukraine as a pretext.
The geopolitical context since 2022 has changed significantly. Europe has already absorbed enormous economic pain to decouple from Russian energy and trade flows. We have reengineered entire sectors, restructured supply chains, diversified energy imports, and reoriented fiscal planning around a new geopolitical map. This transformation has not come cheaply, nor evenly. It came at a big cost to our families. From the earliest days of the war, I have written about sanctions and how they were doomed to fail, because the war did not stop three-and-a-half years later. While the current EU Commission’s leadership remains absorbed in its punitive focus on Russia, we have yet to see a serious, integrated strategy for Ukraine’s long-term future within the European Union. This is the most critical geopolitical mistake made since the beginning of the war. Ukraine’s integration, economic, institutional, and political, should have been the cornerstone of EU external policy since 2022. Instead, we continue to anchor our foreign policy on the idea of containment, failing to match our sanctions rhetoric with a clear roadmap for Ukrainian accession and recovery.
There is, of course, no contradiction between defending Ukraine’s sovereignty and protecting national interests within the EU. As we have shown over the years, Malta is fully committed to the principles of international law, territorial integrity, and multilateral cooperation. But solidarity cannot come at the cost of self-inflicted damage. It is not solidarity to ask member states to undermine their competitive advantages or regulatory independence for the sake of poorly conceived measures that do little to alter the strategic landscape. The United States, too, is increasingly aware of the need for better coordination and coherence. Recent G7 discussions reveal a growing concern, even in Washington, about the sustainability of sanctions as currently designed. There is appetite across the Atlantic for a recalibration, one that ties sanctions more clearly to objectives and mitigates economic spillovers among allies. Well, this is precisely the approach Malta has advocated for, quietly and consistently. Tellingly, each time there is a crisis within the EU Commission, for optics’ sake, they propose sanctions or something relating to Russia to divert attention.
Certainly, Malta will continue to engage constructively in all discussions about Russia, Ukraine, and EU foreign policy. However, it’s important to safeguard our economic and strategic interests, as every other member state has done when their core industries were threatened. The maritime sector is not only an economic pillar for Malta but also a strategic asset for the EU. Undermining it through poorly designed sanctions serves no one. In the months ahead, the EU must learn to pivot, away from punitive rigidity and towards integrative diplomacy. Away from ideological fixation and towards structural vision. And above all, away from personalised policymaking and back to institutional balance.
Malta is ready to play its part in that recalibration. But we will not do so at the expense of national interest, nor in silence.
