The fine line between legal prohibition and moral justification

Recently, news broke that the United States and Israel launched an attack on Iran, saying their goal was to remove the current regime. While few support the regime or its Supreme Leader, it is important to think carefully about the consequences of these actions.

The Iranian regime has maintained power since 1979, following the overthrow of the Shah during the Iranian Revolution. Since then, Iran has contributed to regional unrest through its support of proxy groups targeting Israel and neighbouring states. In Lebanon, Iran established and supported Hezbollah, in Gaza, it has funded and aided Hamas, in Yemen, it has backed the Houthis, and in Iraq, it supports several organisations. Iranian Shahed drones have also been deployed in Ukraine, where Russia has used them to target civilian infrastructure since the onset of the conflict. Approximately 60,000 of these inexpensive drones, often referred to as the AK-47 of the skies, have been used in Ukraine. Consequently, President Zelensky has offered to share expertise on countering these drones with Middle Eastern countries, given Ukraine’s extensive experience in this area.

If the regime’s actions were limited to Iran’s own affairs, the world might pay less attention. Most Iranians are Shia, and Iran leads what is known as the Shia Axis, which is organised under a clerical system where the Imam is seen as the main interpreter of divine will. This system includes Ayatollahs and Grand Ayatollahs, like the Supreme Leader, who was recently killed in a targeted attack. Soon after, the new interim Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Arafi, was reportedly killed – although still unverified – in another airstrike just hours after taking the position. On the military side, Chief of Army Staff General Abdulrahim Mousavi and IRGC Ground Forces Commander Mohammad Pakpour, a key figure in Iran’s military strategy, were also reportedly killed. Other high-ranking officials were eliminated as well, including Defence Minister Aziz Nasirzadeh, former Supreme National Security Council head Ali Shamkhani, Saleh Asadi (head of the Intelligence Directorate of Khatam al-Anbiya emergency command), Mohammad Shirazi (head of the Military Bureau of the Supreme Leader since 1989), Hossein Jabal Amelian (chair of advanced weapons programmes), and Reza Mozaffari-Nia (former head of the same weapons programme).

Beyond the individuals and internal hierarchy, it is necessary to examine the tension between legal norms and perceived legitimacy in these events. Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter requires member states to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, except in cases of self-defence or with Security Council authorisation. Legally, the attack on Iran lacked explicit authorisation and is therefore considered illegal. Nevertheless, proponents of intervention sometimes cite the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which advocates for international action when governments perpetrate grave abuses against their populations. Although not codified in binding law, this principle has influenced debates regarding “just cause” versus legal prohibition. This circumstance poses a critical question. Should legality always take precedence over legitimacy, or can breaching the law be justified to prevent greater harm? However, it is important to consider the consequences of such reasoning.

This operation represents one of the most significant setbacks for the Iranian regime. The United States and Israel have indicated that the conflict may be prolonged. In response, Iran launched missile and drone attacks against Arab states aligned with the United States, including the UAE, Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Israel. Iran also targeted British military bases in Cyprus, asserting that these bases supported US logistics. The Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint between Iran and Oman, has reportedly been closed. This strait is vital for global energy transit, with approximately 20% of the world’s seaborne crude oil and 25% of global liquified natural gas passing through it, primarily from Qatar. Oil exports from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kuwait, the UAE, Qatar, and Iran rely on this corridor. The closure or restriction of the Strait of Hormuz has immediate global repercussions, including energy price spikes and supply disruptions. Energy prices have already increased, and the duration of this circumstance remains uncertain. It is plausible that the resulting economic impact may rival that of the Russia-Ukraine conflict four years ago. This scenario constitutes significant challenges for the European economy, which remains highly dependent on external energy sources. Having diminished reliance on Russian gas, the European Union is now dependent on alternative suppliers and faces considerable vulnerability.

Also, if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, China, as the world’s largest energy importer, will be significantly affected. China relies on the Strait for approximately 40 to 50% of its oil imports from Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran. Nearly all Gulf oil exports transit through this chokepoint, so its closure would jeopardise China’s energy security. In response, Beijing could pursue an urgent diplomatic initiative by dispatching envoys to Gulf capitals to advocate for restraint and a negotiated reopening. Alternatively, China might propose international naval escorts for energy tankers, though this approach could give rise to complex interactions with regional navies. A third option is to draw on China’s strategic petroleum reserves to resolve immediate shortages, but this would only deliver temporary relief. Each of these strategies highlights China’s dependence on stable maritime routes. Most countries would likely seek assistance from the United States to increase oil and gas supplies. The European Union is particularly vulnerable, having shifted away from Russian gas and now relying on alternative suppliers.

The EU’s previous diplomatic initiative, notably through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiated with the Obama Administration, established its credibility as a diplomatic bloc. However, current EU leadership appears largely absent from the crisis, prompting doubts about its capacity to respond effectively. Indeed, President von der Leyen seems to have gone AWOL. It remains to be seen whether this operation was genuinely intended to liberate Iranians from an oppressive regime. The central question is a moral one. Under international law, the operation is illegal because it lacks a United Nations Security Council mandate. However, if the intervention was aimed to free Iranians from a government responsible for violent repression, it is for the people to determine whether such action is justified.

Before reaching a conclusion, each of us must consider whether we would support an unlawful strike if it promised to end violent repression. Is it ever justified to violate international law to save lives, or does this approach risk greater harm? I encourage readers to reflect on these dilemmas. If the removal of the regime ultimately brings stability to the region, some may argue that Western intervention deserves recognition.