As of March 9, 2026, the US-Israeli war with Iran has intensified disputes, shifting conflicts onshore and targeting energy infrastructure – unlike past wars that spared such assets. Iranian drones have rained down on the normally placid cities of the Gulf. Global energy prices have soared, and the UAE has suffered from a subdued flow of tourism.
As oil trading resumed after a brief pause in fighting, the price of Brent crude, the global benchmark, reached nearly $120 a barrel. It is up by 42% since hostilities began. The Iranian regime, despite more than 120 days of being bombed and blockaded by the world’s top military superpower and its Israeli ally, is emboldened.
Claiming that talks with Iran had been “brought to the highest level of Iranian leadership and approved,” Trump said he had “cancelled the planned strikes and bombings against Iran last week.” In response to the US strikes, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps struck US targets on bases in Kuwait and Bahrain and hit and partially destroyed Sheikh Isa Air Base. Nothing is stopping the Iranian state from retaliating against its Western invaders.
Only recently, Iranian media said the army had conducted drone strikes targeting communications antennas and radar facilities belonging to the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain. Add to this a recent air raid alert issued in Bahrain, where residents were urged to head to the nearest safe place. Notice how Kuwait temporarily closed its airspace as its military said its air defence systems were working to intercept hostile aerial targets.
In response to the US strikes, Iran partially destroyed Sheikh Isa Air Base. Readers may ask: what was the effect of the effective closure or minimal traffic in the Strait of Hormuz since early 2026? The short answer is that it has forced production curtailments and highlighted vulnerabilities.
Yet, the flow of oil out of the Gulf needs alternate routes, so many attempts are underway to dig and lay new delivery pipelines that circumvent the export of crude through the Strait of Hormuz. One such project, code-named ADNOC, was approved in mid-May 2026 by Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed bin Zayed. This is not a walk in the park, since construction in a tense region carries security and logistical risks, though parallel routing leverages existing rights-of-way for faster build times.
Long-term, this re-routing of crude encourages diversification but does not fully eliminate global market expectations. One cannot omit mentioning Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline (Petroline). This is a mature, high-capacity bypass system that has been rapidly ramped up and proven resilient during the 2026 Hormuz disruptions, contrasting with the UAE’s ongoing expansion of its smaller-scale Fujairah route.
Saudi Arabia’s system is much larger (7 mb/d versus the UAE’s current 1.5–1.8 mb/d, growing to a future 3.6 mb/d). Naturally, this reflects Saudi Arabia’s vastly higher production base. It provides immediate, battle-tested relief. Together, both pipelines, when fully operational, mitigate but do not fully replace Hormuz volumes (about 20 mb/d pre-crisis). Saudi Arabia benefits more from short-term export continuity, yet the UAE’s expansion aligns with its capacity ambitions.
These efforts build on existing infrastructure but have been accelerated due to the ongoing Strait of Hormuz disruptions. Pressure is mounting on Trump to solve the dispute, particularly from American motorists now paying over $5.10 for a gallon of petrol on average.
Let us look for an alternative crude supply away from the troublesome Gulf area. Can the eastern and central Mediterranean basin prove to be an alternative source? The answer is not in the next decade. In fact, there is a low and declining share of oil produced from the central Mediterranean area (offshore around Sicily and the Sicily Channel). This represents a relatively small part of overall crude-oil output.
Most of Italy’s domestic oil production in recent years has been onshore (notably Basilicata – e.g., Tempa Rossa) and in the Adriatic Sea. One can deduce that the central Mediterranean offshore plays a minor role by volume compared with Gulf areas. Eni is the major Italian player in offshore hydrocarbon activity, including exploration and production around Sicily. Other companies and operators may hold smaller stakes or operate onshore and in the Adriatic; however, Italy is a substantial net importer of crude and petroleum products.
There has been ongoing exploration interest, including licence rounds and seismic surveys such as those in Malta, in the central Mediterranean. However, successful large oil discoveries and subsequent high-volume production in the central Mediterranean have been limited. Much of the recent investment has focused on gas rather than crude extraction. Regulatory sensitivities and public opposition surrounding offshore drilling – particularly concerning coastal tourism, fisheries, and environmental concerns – limit easy expansion in nearshore zones.
Back to the fragile situation of crude deliveries out of Hormuz, one expects that a short-term solution is to bypass it via pipeline installations, yet this takes time. In a post-resolution scenario, these would complement the reopening of the Strait by providing redundant and secure export routes.
In summary, can we conclude that oil riches have once again spurred a second turbulent Gulf war?
